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THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF RENEGOTIATION
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
WARREN F. SCHWARTZ and ALAN 0. SYKES*

ABSTRACT

The treaty creating the World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute resolution system, which contained
no formal sanctions for breach of agreement as a practical matter, with a system that
results in centrally authorized sanctions against recalcitrant violators of WTO trade
agreements. We examine the important features of the new system and argue that
the institutionalization of a sanctioning mechanism was not motivated by a perceived
need to increase the penalty for violations, but rather by a need to decrease the
penalty. In particular, the GATT system relied on unilateral retaliation and reputation
to police the bargain. Toward its end, unilateral retaliation became excessive and
interfered with opportunities for efficient breach. The WTO mechanism for arbitrating
the magnitude of proposed sanctions is the major innovation under WTO law and
ensures that sanctions are not set too high.

THIS paper is a contribution to the growing theoretical literature on the
positive political economy of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
incorporates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and supplementary agreements on trade in goods, the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).' The focus of the paper is on the procedures
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University, and Frank and Bernice Greenberg Professor of
Law, University of Chicago, respectively. We thank Richard Diamond, John Ferejohn, Frieder
Roessler, conference participants at Georgetown, and the organizers and participants in the
Rational Choice in International Law conference at Chicago for their many insights and
suggestions.
' See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round (hereinafter Legal Instruments) vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994). The Agreement includes a version of the GATT that is substantially different
from that promulgated in 1947. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30,
1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (hereinafter GATT 1947). See also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994,
Legal Instruments vol. 5, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). See generally General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the
Multilateral Trade Organization, December 15, 1993, Legal Instruments vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 29
(1994) (hereinafter GATT 1994).
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for dispute settlement set out in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
or DSU).2 Our goal is to develop an economic explanation for the structure
of the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The point of departure is the proposition that the WTO agreements are,
in effect, contracts among the political actors who negotiated and signed
them. As with all contracts, it is in the interest of the signatories to maximize
the joint gains from trade, that is, to enable the signatories to attain their
Pareto frontier.' Drawing on public choice theory, we further posit that the
welfare of political officials is best measured by their political support 4-the
factors that affect their ability to retain political power. A treaty on the Pareto
frontier for political actors will then have the property that no alternative
treaty can increase the political support for one signatory official without
decreasing the political support for another. It is our thesis that the rules and
procedures for renegotiation and dispute resolution in the WTO, which we
set out in detail below, are explicable by this logic of joint political welfare
maximization. This claim may seem obvious, but it is the details of the
argument that make it interesting. In elaborating the argument, we draw
considerably on the public choice literature and on the economic theory of
contracts.
The analysis focuses on three central features of the WTO system that we
believe have not been assigned sufficient importance or adequately explained
by traditional international law scholars.' The first can be found in the rules
structuring the renegotiation and modification of WTO commitments. A
prominent aspect of these provisions is that a member nation that wishes to
deviate from its commitments may do so even if it is unable to secure
permission from other nations by offers of compensatory trade concessions.
If negotiations over compensation reach impasse, the nation wishing to deviate may proceed, and adversely affected nations may then withdraw "substantially equivalent" concessions in response. The second feature on which
we focus involves the sanctions for breach of obligations. After a country
is adjudged to be in violation of a WTO agreement, sanctions are limited to
the withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions previously granted to
the country committing the violation by the country (or countries) harmed
by the violation. More severe sanctions, which might at times be necessary
if the violator is to be coerced into complying with its obligations, are not
permitted. The third, related feature on which we focus concerns the mea2 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Legal
Instruments vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) (hereinafter DSU).
3See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored
Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.
27, 39 (1996).
4

d.

'We sketch these provisions here and document them in detail below.
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surement of substantially equivalent concessions. After a party has been found
to be in violation of its obligations, it has a "reasonable time" to correct the
problem. Only if it fails to do so within that time are sanctions allowed at
all, and even then the sanctions are limited to measures substantially equivalent to the ongoing harm caused by the violation after the reasonable time
for cure has elapsed. No sanctions are allowed for harm caused prior to that
point in time.
We believe that these features can be understood using the economic theory
of contract remedies. Economic theory teaches that a key objective of an
enforcement system is to induce a party to comply with its obligations whenever compliance will yield greater benefits to the promisee than costs to the
promisor, while allowing the promisor to depart from its obligations whenever
the costs of compliance to the promisor exceed the benefits to the promisee.
In the parlance of contact theory, the objective is to deter inefficient breaches
but to encourage efficient ones.6 In the sections that follow, we will argue
that the WTO provisions respecting renegotiation and the settlement of disputes over breach of obligations are carefully designed to facilitate efficient
adjustments to unanticipated circumstances. We also conclude that formal
sanctions in the WTO system are relatively unimportant to the other goal of
contract remedies-the deterrence of inefficient breach.
Section I provides some pertinent background from the economic theory
of contracts. Section II addresses renegotiation within the WTO system.
Sections III and IV then consider the provisions for sanctioning nations
discovered to be in violation of their commitments.
I.

EFFICIENT ADJUSTMENT OF CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS: OF
DAMAGES AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, LIABILITY

RULES AND PROPERTY RULES

Many contracts are negotiated under conditions of considerable complexity
and uncertainty, and it is not economical for the parties to specify in advance
how they ought to behave under every conceivable contingency. In such
contracts, circumstances may arise in which it is in the joint interests of the
parties for one of them to deviate from its commitments, or "breach" the
contract.
There are essentially two mechanisms that parties to incomplete private
contracts employ to encourage efficient performance of commitments while
6 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 290 (1988); see also Robert L.
Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L.
Rev. 273,284-86 (1970) ("Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor
is able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would
have occupied had performance been rendered. . . To penalize such adjustments through
overcompensation of the innocent party is to discourage efficient reallocation of community
resources. . . . Rigidity resulting from thus binding a party to his undertaking limits the factor
and product mobility essential to proper functioning of the market mechanism.").
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facilitating efficient breach of commitments. The first involves the award of

expectation damages, which place the promisee in as good a position as it
would have been in if the promisor had performed. Expectation damages
thus deter inefficient breach because the promisor will not wish to violate

and pay expectation damages unless the promisor gains more from the breach
than the promisee loses, in which case breach is efficient.7 The weakness of
this approach is that the measurement of damages by a court is costly, and

errors in assessing damages may deter efficient breach if they are too high
or permit inefficient breach if they are too low.8

The mechanism that employs expectation damages as the means for inducing performance when it is efficient, and breach when it is not, is known
as a "liability rule." A party who wishes to deviate from its commitments

may do so without the need to secure the permission of any adversely affected
party but is liable for damages as a result.9

The second mechanism that can encourage efficient performance while
allowing efficient breach involves renegotiation, motivated by an order for
specific performance. In this case, the promisor is directed to perform, and
a failure to do so will be punished so severely that a party will never prefer

violating the order directing performance to complying with its obligation.
But the promisor can still avoid its commitments by securing permission
from the promisee, usually by paying for it. Since the promisor will pay no
more than the value to it of the breach, and the promisee will accept no less
than the value of the harm it will suffer from the breach, an agreement that
permits the promisor to breach can be reached only when the benefit to the

promisor of the breach exceeds the harm to the promisee resulting from the
breach, that is, when breach is efficient.
A mechanism whereby the promisor must secure the permission of the
promisee before deviating from its obligations is a form of property rule.'0
The term comes from the analogy to tangible property, which ordinarily
cannot legally be taken from one private party by another unless the latter
party grants permission, usually by selling it. A property rule here avoids
'See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 117-26 (4th ed. 1992); John H.
Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. Legal Stud. 277, 283-89
(1972); Birmingham, supra note 6, at 284-86; and Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for
Breach of Contract, 11 Bell J. Econ. 466 (1980).
8 See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1, 6-7 (1989); see
generally Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L. J. 271 (1979); Thomas
S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341 (1984).
9 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092-93 (1972); see also Ian
Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasian
Trade, 104 Yale L. J. 1027, 1036-72 (1995); and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 715 (1996).
"0See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092-93; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9,
at 715.
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the difficulties associated with having a court compute expectation damages.
But it introduces other costs-those associated with the transaction costs of
bargaining between the promisor and the promisee over the possibility of
modifying obligations, including those attributable to strategic behavior during the bargaining process. When these costs are sufficiently low in relation
to the judicial and error costs of expectation damages, however, the property
rule mechanism will be preferable. It is also likely to be preferable if deviation
from obligations is always inefficient.
This background will be quite helpful in our discussion of the WTO system.
As we explain below, the system consistently employs liability rules rather
than property rules to protect WTO commitments against breach. It does so,
we believe, out of concern that an alternative approach would make it too
difficult for WTO members to modify their commitments efficiently. Further,
the protection of the liability rule is limited in unusual ways, much more so
than in the context of private contracts. This feature, we believe, is attributable
to the fact that formal sanctions are a relatively unimportant factor in inducing
member nations to live up to their commitments. The following sections
elaborate these claims.

H.

RENEGOTIATION AND MODIFICATION OF CONCESSIONS IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM

Public choice teaches that the objectives that individual countries pursue
through international agreements are determined by an interaction among
organized interest groups." While this process is not fully understood and
assuredly varies across nations, there is wide agreement that producer interests
will exercise disproportionately greater influence than will consumer interests,
at least in the democracies that dominate the developed world (and thus the
trading community). 2 Hence, multilateral agreements that reduce trade barriers are not driven primarily by a desire to benefit consumers (despite the
fact that they do) but by a desire to benefit certain producer groups. Trade
concessions by one nation are made in exchange for reciprocal trade concessions by other nations that will afford exporters greater access to foreign
markets. Exporters will reward their political officials for securing these
concessions. Where these political rewards exceed the political costs associated with reduced protection for import-competing domestic industries,

" See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 28; see generally Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice
2-3 (1973); and Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, 1132-67 (1965).
2 See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 28; see also Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a
"Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations,
58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 275 (1991).
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political officials will benefit on balance and conclude agreements for mutual
reduction of trade impediments. 3
But the parties to trade agreements, like the parties to private contracts,
enter the bargain under conditions of uncertainty. Economic conditions may
change, the strength of interest group organization may change, and so on.
Accordingly, officials cannot be certain that the bargain they strike will benefit
them in all of its details. Likewise, even where the bargain on a particular
issue is initially beneficial, changing circumstances may make it politically
unappealing. For these reasons, the drafters of trade agreements may be
expected to include devices for adjusting the bargain when it proves mutually
disadvantageous.
As noted above, the performance of contractual obligations becomes inefficient when the benefits to the promisee(s) of performance are less than
the costs to the promisor of performance. Joint gains then arise if the promisor
does not perform, gains that can be distributed ex ante or ex post in any
manner that the parties prefer. Although this theory of efficient performance
and nonperformance has been developed with reference to private contracts,
where the costs and benefits of performance may be measured in money, it
applies equally to other bargains such as trade agreements. And the theory
of public choice suggests that the metric of welfare for each signatory to a
trade agreement will not be money, but instead will be the political welfare
(votes, campaign contributions, or graft, as the case may be) of its political
officials." Any Pareto optimal trade agreement must maximize a weighted
sum of this welfare measure for each signatory government. 5 Implicit, then,
in any optimal agreement is a set of weights (called "shadow prices" by
economists) that allow the political welfare of one government to be traded
off against the welfare of another.
The welfare weights implicit in any Pareto optimal agreement also serve
to identify the conditions under which the nonperformance of obligations is
efficient. When the political burden of performance to a promisor exceeds
the political detriment of nonperformance to the promisee(s), evaluated at
the proper weight or shadow price, nonperformance is jointly desirable.
Roughly speaking, the political costs of performance may be said to exceed
the benefits of performance, just as benefits may exceed costs in the case of
a private contract where both are measured in money. It is in the interests
"3See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 28-29; see also Robert Baldwin, The Economics
of the GATr, in Issues in International Economics (Peter Oppenheimer ed. 1980); Sykes, supra
note 12, at 275; and Mueller, supra note 11, at 123. See generally Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert
M. Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade (1992).
1 See Mueller, supra note 11, at 2-3.
See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 28-29; compare Eric Talley, Turning Servile
Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 Yale
L. J. 277, 321 (1998).
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of parties to trade agreements to facilitate nonperformance under these
conditions.16
Following our earlier discussion, the parties to any kind of contract can
facilitate efficient adjustment of obligations in three ways. First, they can
specify in the contract itself the conditions under which performance will
not be required or the price for a party to buy out of a particular obligation-force majeure clauses and liquidated damages clauses in private contracts are examples of this approach. Second, when their contract is incomplete as to certain contingencies that may arise, they can agree on (or embrace
a legal system that provides them with) a liability rule that encourages efficient nonperformance. As discussed above, the familiar rule of expectation
damages in contract law is such a rule. Third, the parties can embrace a
property rule and simply renegotiate when performance becomes inefficient.
The promisor can buy its way out of the obligation to perform by paying
the promisee(s) an amount that makes it whole and still leaves the promisor
better off than with performance of the original obligation.
The provisions of the WTO agreements pertaining to renegotiation exhibit
aspects of the first two approaches but stop short of creating a property rule.
Consider first the Article XIX escape clause, which authorizes temporary
measures that would otherwise violate WTO commitments for the protection
of industries that are experiencing severe dislocation due to increased import
competition. 7 Such industries are likely to have rates of return well below
the competitive level and, as a result, to be losing quasi rents on fixed
investments. On average, they will lobby more vigorously for protection than
other industries because the benefits of protection are less dissipated (if at
all) by new entry; to the extent that protection merely raises the rate of return
toward the competitive level, no new domestic competitors will be induced
to enter the industry." Industries that are profitable and growing are likely
to have returns above the competitive level in many cases, which will eventually be dissipated by entry regardless of government policy at home or
abroad. Hence, they have less incentive to lobby for domestic protection and
less incentive to punish their political leaders for failing to maintain access
to foreign markets at historical levels. Accordingly, it will be politically
efficient, from the perspective of parties to trade agreements, to afford tran6

A formal model that develops these results may be found in Sykes, supra note 12, in the

appendix.
"7
See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XIX(l)(a). The provision reads in full: "If, as a result
of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party
under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the

territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly
competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to

the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend
the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession."
" See Sykes, supra note 12, at 274.
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sitory protection, at the expense of growing and prosperous foreign competitors, to import-competing industries that suffer severe dislocation. The
escape clause permits such measures and may thus be viewed as an example
of the first option above for facilitating efficient nonperformance, a provision
written into the contract that excuses performance under specified
contingencies.
To be sure, the concern arises that a nation may abuse its right to use the
escape clause, imposing protection when it creates more political detriment
abroad than can be justified by the benefits it creates at home. A compensation
requirement can help to deter such inefficient behavior and was included in
the escape clause system until the Uruguay Round. 9 The new, partial exemption from the compensation requirement for the first 3 years of an escape
clause measure2" suggests a judgment by the WTO membership that oversight
by the strengthened dispute resolution process can adequately police abuse
of such measures and that a compensation requirement is no longer essential
to keep the member nations "honest."
A more comprehensive provision for adjustment of the bargain is Article
XXVIII of GATT 1994 (and its GATS counterpart, Article XXI).2" Unlike
Article XIX, Article XXVIII does not set out specific contingencies under
which deviation from obligations is permissible but instead establishes a
procedure under which, subject to certain constraints, any tariff concession
can be withdrawn for any reason for an indefinite period of time. It requires
as part of this process that nations seeking to withdraw concessions offer
compensatory concessions to affected trading partners.22 But it is noteworthy
that Article XXVIII does not require the member who is withdrawing a
concession to secure the permission of affected trading partners-it does not
create a property rule. Instead, although members are asked to negotiate
mutually satisfactory compensation with other members if possible, Article
XXVIII provides that a member may proceed to withdraw concessions in
cases where negotiations over compensation break down and further provides
that adversely affected trading partners may at that point unilaterally withdraw
"9See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XIX(3)(a) ("If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes
to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken
or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free . . . to suspend . . . such
substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension
of which the [GAIT membership as a whole does] not disapprove.").
20 See Agreement on Safeguards on Legal Instruments vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1128, art. 19 (1994).
21See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XXVIH. See also General Agreement on Trade in
Services, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1B, art. XXI, Legal Instruments vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) (hereinafter GATS).
22See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XXVII(2) ("In such negotiations and agreement, which
may include provision for compensatory adjustment with respect to other products, the contracting parties concerned shall endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually
advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement
prior to such negotiations.").
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substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations.23 Ultimately, then,
concessions are protected by a liability rule. And the magnitude of "liability"
is clearly specified-concessions substantially equivalent to those withdrawn
by the member that proceeds under Article XXVIII.
We believe that the explanation for these provisions lies in the desire of
signatories to facilitate efficient breach and in the relative superiority of a
liability rule approach to that task. At first blush, this claim may seem surprising because the harm done to political officials by a breach of promise
in the WTO is no doubt difficult to measure precisely, and when damages
are hard to calculate, that fact is usually thought to be a heavy thumb on
the scale favoring a property rule over a liability rule. But there is a countervailing consideration here that is compelling. Under the most-favorednation principle of the WTO,24 trade concessions must extend equally to all
WTO members (WTO membership includes 144 countries at this writing). 5
Hence, under a property rule, a nation seeking to depart from a prior concession would have to secure the permission of potentially dozens of other
nations. It would then face an acute holdout problem as each of the many
promisees tried to capture as much as possible of the gain that the promisor
could realize from avoiding the concession. Such strategic behavior might
prevent agreement from being reached at all, or at least delay it uneconomically while negotiation and posturing dragged along. The liability rule
approach of Article XXVIII averts this problem.
Further, by limiting the retaliatory withdrawal of concessions to those
substantially equivalent, the system seeks to ensure that the price for nonperformance under the liability rule is not too high. Although the phrasing
is somewhat vague, a withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions may
be understood as allowing members adversely affected by a withdrawal of
concessions under Article XXVIII to raise their level of political welfare by
reimposing protection for the benefit of domestic constituencies that will
reward them for it, but only up to the point that their level of political welfare
is restored to its original level. Indeed, during discussions on Article XXVIII
in the Tariff Agreements Committee in 1947, the proposal to include a provision for compensatory withdrawal was explained as follows: "[I1f we wish
to take an item out of our Schedule then clearly it is fair and proper that the
countries with whom we negotiate should be free to make the corresponding
changes in their Schedules in order to restore the balance . . . but we want
any such exercise to be limited to what is corresponding and not to be used
Id. at art. XXV1f(3).
Id. at art. 1:1 (requiring "that any privilege, advantage, or benefit granted to imports from
one [WTO] member be extended to imports of similar products from all other [WTO] members."); see also GATS, supra note 22, art. 11:1 (including nearly identical most favored nation
status to members).
25See World Trade Organization Web site, http://www.wto.org.
23
24
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in a punitive way."" In other words, political expectations under the bargain
are protected by a rough equivalent of expectation damages, but nations are
disabled from insisting on more because any greater level of retaliatory withdrawal would raise the price of nonperformance above the costs to the disadvantaged promisees and thus discourage efficient nonperformance.
II.

THE LIABILITY RULE REMEDY FOR VIOLATION OF WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION OBLIGATIONS

The most intriguing use of a liability rule in the WTO system is pursuant
to the DSU, which governs claims by one member nation that another has
violated its obligations. Article 21(3) of the DSU provides that a member
has a reasonable period of time to bring its policies into conformity with its
obligations after it has been found to have violated them. 27 Article 22(1) then
states that compensation or a suspension of concessions may result if compliance has not been achieved within a reasonable period of time. 28 The first
step in the process is a negotiation over compensation, in effect to determine
whether the case can be "settled. 29 Should those negotiations fail, the aggrieved party (or parties) can propose a suspension of concessions, which
must be substantially equivalent to the ongoing harm that they suffer from
the violation.3" An arbitration procedure exists to examine the substantial
equivalence question if the member faced with such a suspension of concessions objects that the suspension is excessive. 3'
Plainly, as with Article XXVIII discussed above, this system is best seen
as one embracing a liability rule rather than a property rule. A party found
to be in violation of its obligations can, if it so chooses, continue to violate
them. The ultimate price to be paid, if the case is not settled, is the withdrawal
of substantially equivalent concessions. This structure must, we submit, reflect a collective judgment that a property rule (for example, a threat to expel
the recalcitrant violator if it does not cease and desist) would be inferior.
The reasons why relate to the considerations discussed above-the large
transaction costs and opportunities for strategic behavior that would arise if
26

UN Doc. TAC/PV/14 at 20.

See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 21(3) ("If it is impractical to comply immediately with the
recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time
in which to do so.").
28Id. at art. 22(1) ("Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations
are temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not
implemented within a reasonable period of time.").
29Id. at art. 22(2) ("[Sluch Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of
the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute
settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation.").
30Id. at art. 22(4) ("The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized
by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.").
31Id. at art. 22(6-7).
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a member trying to adjust its obligations had to secure the permission of all
of the affected members.
Recent WTO decisions make clear that our interpretation of WTO law is
correct, even if they do not clearly acknowledge the liability rule nature of
the system. In the "bananas" dispute between the United States and the
European Union (EU), the EU declined to comply with a panel ruling because
it found that its tariff preferences for bananas from certain nations violated
WTO law. The United States then invoked its retaliation rights and proposed
substantial sanctions that the EU challenged before an arbitration panel as
excessive. In defending its proposed sanctions, the United States argued that
its "suspension (of trade concessions) is an incentive for prompt compliance. . . . [P]recision in measuring trade damage is not required."32 The
United States thus suggested, in effect, that the purpose of the sanction was
to enforce a property rule and that careful calibration of sanctions was unnecessary. The arbitrators rejected this position: "We agree with the United
States . . . that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance.
But, this purpose does not mean that the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body]
should grant authorization to suspend concessions beyond what is equivalent
to the level of nullification or impairment. In our view there is nothing in
[the relevant provisions of the DSU] that could be read as a justification for
countermeasures of a punitive nature."33
By refusing to permit the imposition of "punitive" sanctions, the arbitrators
impliedly acknowledged that the sanction is more in the nature of compensation than punishment. They set a price for the EU's persistence in its
violation of WTO law equal to the harm caused to its trading partners. The
system thus allows violations to persist as long as the violator is willing to
pay that price, which is the essence of a liability rule approach.
We note that our conclusion is somewhat at odds with the views of other
scholars in the field. John Jackson recently addressed the question of whether
a WTO member nation that had been found to be in violation of its commitments and that refused to bring its behavior into compliance should be
deemed to be in violation of international law.34 He concludes that a refusal
to comply with WTO treaty obligations is indeed a violation of international
law, even if compensation is agreed upon or if a retaliatory suspension of
concessions is in place.35 In so concluding, he in effect further concludes
that a member of the WTO is obligated to comply with its obligations in all
circumstances.
32Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration
by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU-Decision by the Arbitrators,
WT/DS27/ARB, art. 6.1 (April 9, 1999).
IId. at art. 6.3.
See John H. Jackson, Editorial Comment, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 Am. J. Int'l L. 60, 60 (1997).
35Id.
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Jackson does not base his conclusion on policy or on any articulation of
why he believes that strict compliance with all obligations at all points in
time should be the preferred outcome for the WTO membership. Rather, he
cites 11 textual provisions of the WTO in support of his position. The two
that most powerfully support his argument are the following:
Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary
measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor
the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation
of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered
agreements. 36
The suspension of concession or other obligations shall be temporary. . . . [T]he
DSB shall continue to keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings... [while] the recommendations to bring a measure into
conformity with the covered agreements have not been implemented.37
We acknowledge that the provisions of the WTO relied on by Jackson
provide reasonable support for his conclusion that WTO members are obligated to comply with dispute resolution decisions that go against them.
Nevertheless, we disagree with that proposition, both as a matter of textual
interpretation and for policy reasons implicit in our discussion to this point.
Our arguments from the text are straightforward. The statement in the first
passage that compliance is "preferred" is weak-it does not say that compliance is mandatory, and it seems to us that this provision does not exclude
the possibility that noncompliance may in some cases be acceptable. The
ongoing surveillance discussed in the second passage indeed hints at an
obligation to comply, but there is certainly another interpretation. Because
circumstances change and the proper calibration of the substantially equivalent concessions may change as well, it is perhaps not surprising that the
DSB should exercise some continuing oversight in these cases much as a
conventional court might retain jurisdiction over a case where damages are
payable over time (such as child support payments under family law or
medical monitoring costs in tort). Likewise, ongoing violations may have an
impact on parties other than the original disputants. Continued publicity and
oversight may thus serve to alert other members who might suffer redressable
harm. Finally, and related perhaps to the third-party effects just mentioned,
we do not dispute that a "preference" for compliance seems implicit in the
system. Ongoing oversight thus serves to check periodically on whether the
impasse that led to compensation or retaliation may have lifted. In effect,
the violating country is required to persuade the international community
that persisting in the violation is desirable. Hence, the existence of continued
36

See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22(1).

37

Id. at art. 22(8).
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oversight by no means excludes the possibility that members have the legal
right to opt for paying damages in the form of a loss of trade concessions
from other parties.
Our final argument from the overall structure of the text is even more
straightforward. We simply note that the provisions of the DSU, taken as a
whole, allow a violator to continue a violation in perpetuity, as long as it
compensates or is willing to bear the costs of the retaliatory suspension of
concessions. If WTO members really wanted to make compliance with dispute resolution findings mandatory, they would have imposed some greater
penalty for noncompliance to induce it.
Turning to policy, the starting point is the observation that the textual
provisions cited by Jackson both begin by asserting that the withdrawal of
concessions is to be viewed as a "temporary" measure. It would seem then
that, at least for some temporary period of time, a violation coupled with
the withdrawal of concessions is acknowledged to be potentially superior to
immediate compliance. Indeed, the fact that violators are given a reasonable
period of time to conform their policies before sanctions or compensation
become possible further supports the proposition that some period of deviation is seen as potentially valuable.
The reason why is not difficult to divine. World Trade Organization violations are typically the result of domestic laws and regulations enacted by
the violating country. Thus, curing the violation requires a new law or regulation that repeals the one that constitutes the violation. For a number of
reasons it may be politically difficult, conceivably impossible, to enact such
a change. The legislative and regulatory processes are, of course, elaborate
and costly. Proposed changes must compete for a place on the agenda. Interest
groups who gain from the violation will oppose repeal and be able to exploit
differences among supporters of repeal as to what compensating benefits, if
any, should be granted to the industries who will lose the benefits of the law.
If these factors make some delay in compliance inevitable, as the system
apparently acknowledges and tolerates, there is no reason to think that they
may not at times make compliance politically infeasible for an extended
period of time. And rather than expel the member who faces such political
difficulty or impose some other draconian penalty, the system instead acknowledges that the joint interests of the parties may be better served by
compensation or retaliation that restores the benefits of the bargain to aggrieved parties while allowing officials in the violator nation to continue
doing what must be done out of political necessity.
Indeed, if one is to claim that the purposes of the WTO members would
be better served by compliance in all circumstances, it seems that one must
believe that at the time the WTO rules were devised, the drafters were able
to anticipate every situation in which the costs of compliance would exceed
the benefits of compliance and include provisions to excuse compliance in
all of these circumstances. In the parlance of contract theory, the parties
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would have had to be able to write a complete contract expressly specifying
what would be required in all circumstances that might arise. We think it
plainly unrealistic to think that the many parties to the WTO agreement,
covering as it does matters of great complexity, could have done so successfully. Knowing that, they framed a dispute resolution system designed
to facilitate efficient breach by using a sensible liability rule for that purpose.
But there is one possible response that warrants attention. It might be
argued that strict compliance with the rulings of the dispute resolution process
is desirable and that adjustments to unanticipated circumstances should always be made via the renegotiation process of Article XXVIII. The drafters
did not imagine that they could write a complete contract, the argument runs,
but they wanted all changes to occur through tariff renegotiations.
One difficulty with this argument is that it presupposes that changes in
most-favored-nation tariff rates can adequately address the political difficulties that arise from unanticipated circumstances. It seems unlikely that
this will be true. The recent beef hormones case38 is a good illustration. The
EU was held to have violated its obligations under the WTO Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Code by prohibiting imports of hormone-raised beef,
ostensibly because of health concerns. If the continuation of the ban were
nevertheless a political necessity for European officials, a uniform change
in the tariff rates applicable to all beef from all sources, hormone raised or
not, could not replicate its effects. Here, deviation from a nontariff commitment would seem necessary and renegotiation of tariffs a politically unsatisfactory substitute.
In short, it seems clear to us that the WTO system contemplates departures
from specified obligations when the costs of compliance exceed the associated
benefits, whether those obligations are tariffs or nontariff issues. We can see
no other purpose to the provisions that allow departure from obligations
when agreement is not reached and confer on the promisee only the right to
withdraw substantially equivalent concessions. Such a provision can only
represent an institutional means for setting an appropriate price for violating
commitments when the price cannot be determined through negotiations.
IV.

THE LIMITED SCOPE OF SANCTIONS IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION SYSTEM

We have focused thus far on the role of a liability rule in the WTO system
in facilitating efficient deviations from commitments following a change in
circumstances. We now consider the second role of a liability rule-to deter
violations when the benefits of compliance are greater than the costs of
compliance.
38 See Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat

and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (January 16, 1998).
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The Absence of Sanctions prior to the World Trade Organization

What is remarkable about the WTO/GATT system is how unimportant
formal sanctions have been in encouraging compliance with trade commitments throughout its history. As noted, the WTO succeeded the GATT, which
began in 1947." 9 Until 1995, when the WTO agreements superseded the
GATT, it was effectively impossible for a nation that was found to have
violated the GATTI to become subject to formal sanctions. The reason was
the consensus rule, which held that any nation could block the authority for
the imposition of sanctions, including the nation that had violated the GATIT
and was threatened with them!4 ° Indeed, until 1989, a potential disputant
could even block the formation of a dispute resolution panel to hear the
merits of a complaint.4" As a result, GAIT dispute resolution was limited to
system that would often (but not always) hear the merits of a complaint and
render a decision about the existence of a violation but would never proceed
to the point of imposing penalties when a violation was found.42
Nevertheless, the GATT system held together rather well. Tariffs in the
developed world fell from an average of nearly 50 percent in 1947 to an
average of about 5 percent by the end of the GATT.43 To be sure, some
cheating on obligations occurred, but the level of cheating was modest. We
are unaware, for example, of any allegation in the history of the system that

a nation flagrantly refused to comply with one of its tariff commitments by
raising a tariff rate above an agreed tariff limit. Further, where cheating might
be said to exist by some, it was often an efficient, tacit amendment of the
9 See sources cited in note 1 supra.
o See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 117 (1999) ("[A] disputing nation could block adoption of a report and then
argue that no binding requirement exists for it to follow the report."); see also John H. Jackson,
William J. Dovey, & Alan 0. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations:
Cases, Materials, and Text 830 (3d ed. 1995) ("Prior to the Uruguay Round, the GATT dispute
resolution process could be 'blocked' by one of the disputants under the 'concensus rule'-the
losing party to a dispute had to agree to accept the outcome before any formal action could
be taken to authorize sanctions.").
" See 1989 Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, 36th
Supp. BISD 61 (1990).
42See Jackson, supra note 40, at 116 ("Although the Contracting Parties were authorized
(by majority vote) to suspend concessions (by way of retorsion, retaliation, or 'balancing of
benefits'-a term which is not and never has been clear), they actually did so in only one case.
That instance was the result of a complaint brought by The Netherlands against the United
States for the latter's use, contrary to GAIT, of import restraints on imported dairy products
from The Netherlands. For seven years in a row, The Netherlands was authorized to utilize
restraints against importation of U.S. grain, although it never acted on that authorization. This
had no effect on U.S. action, however.").
" See Multilateral and Regional Efforts to Integrate Markets: The Uruguay Round, NAFTA,
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Initiatives, and the European Communities, 87 Am. Soc'y
Int'l L. Proc. 340, 349 (1993) (remarks of Herman von Bertrab, NAFTA Office, Embassy of
Mexico).
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bargain.' When such tacit modifications are put to one side, the incidence
of flagrant cheating under the GATT system was indeed quite low.45
Our explanation for this state of affairs emphasizes that there are strong
forces that induce countries to comply with their obligations, although no
costs would be formally imposed on them by the GATT if they deviated.
Three considerations explain why the system worked as well as it did: the
domestic costs of violations, reputational sanctions for noncompliance, and
unilateral retaliation against violators.
1.

Domestic Costs of Violations

It will often be true that domestic political considerations encourage a
country to comply with its commitments under trade agreements. This is true
for two sets of reasons.
The first relates to the way the balance of political forces that favor trade
protection and trade liberalization will change following the advent of a
market-opening trade agreement. As a preliminary, protectionism induces
inefficient investments in the domestic production of certain goods and services by importing nations. Those investments commonly entail sunk costs
in the form of physical capital that cannot readily transfer to other uses and
specific human capital with the same property. The owners of these sunk
investments will lose quasi rents on them if protection is removed and will
thus devote resources to the political process to protect those rents." These
efforts by import-competing firms and workers may prove insufficient to
prevent the lowering of trade barriers, however, because the exporters who
benefit from reciprocal trade liberalization may be willing to pay more to
their officials to secure access to foreign markets than import-competing
interests will pay to keep their market protected. If so, a trade agreement
will be struck.
Following the trade agreement, the rate of return to firms and workers in
the formerly protected industries will tend to fall below a competitive level
because of the introduction of more efficient foreign competitors, and they
will begin to exit. Concomitantly, their sunk investments decay over time as
physical capital depreciates and specific human capital is replaced by the
workers who retrain to work in other industries. The pressure from the owners
of sunk investments for the reimposition of protection should fall steadily
4' For example, the general failure of parties to demonstrate under the Escape Clause that
a surge in import competition was attributable to a particular trade concession and that it was
"unforeseen," as required by Article XIX, was really a tacit amendment to the original GAIT
that all parties accepted and that was later incorporated into the Safeguards Agreement. See
Sykes, supra note 12, at 287-88.
" See Robert E. Hudec, Daniel L. Kennedy, & Mark Sgorbossa, A Statistical Profile of
GAT1T Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2 Minn. J. Global Trade 1, 32-34 (1993).
4 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of "Injury" in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 5, 24 (1996).
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as these specific investments decay. In the limiting case, no specific investments remain, and renewed protection would simply necessitate new investment in an industry that would earn no more than a competitive rate of
return. No one would benefit from such protection given the opportunity to
earn competitive returns elsewhere, and the pressure for renewed protection
would drop to zero. In more realistic cases, some pressure for protection will
remain from those whose human or physical capital would earn at least
transitory rents from protection, but in most cases the magnitude of that
pressure should still be considerably lower than it was before trade was
liberalized in the first instance, when sunk investments in the protected industry were much more important.
Reciprocally, political pressure to resist renewed protection may grow with
time. In particular, where the imports in question are utilized by producing
industries, which tend to be better organized than ordinary consumers, a
constituency may develop whose returns on their own fixed investments
would be impaired by a significant increase in the price of imports.
In sum, the political balance of interests favoring and opposing the results
of a trade agreement may be expected to tilt quite systematically toward
those favoring the agreement as time passes. A fortiori, the political pressure
to comply with market-opening commitments in trade agreements will tend
to strengthen over time, and pressures to deviate from many commitments
may simply disappear. We conjecture that this phenomenon also has much
to say about the reasons why the WTO system has slowly ratcheted down
protection through a series of rounds over the years-each round goes as far
as it can given the resistance from import-competing industries, but as that
resistance decays after each round is completed, new opportunities for politically profitable deals emerge with time. It may also explain why concessions often have to be implemented only gradually over time.
A second domestic political reason why nations may be inclined to comply
with their trade commitments relates to the fact that it may be more costly
for interest groups to seek protection than to resist its abolition. In the United
States, for example, trade agreements are followed by implementing legislation that conforms federal law (including tariff rates) to the new agreement.
A constituency favoring renewed protection, then, must incur the costs of
changing a federal statute. Prior to the agreement, by contrast, those favoring
trade liberalization must incur the costs of changing the federal statute (as
well as of encouraging the international negotiation). It is likely easier to
defend an existing statute than to change it for a variety of reasons. Time
on the legislative agenda is scarce. Also, individual members of Congress
(such as key committee chairs) may have the effective power to veto change,
yet they will lack the power by themselves to effect change. Thus, parties
resisting change may need fewer political figures to support them than parties
seeking change.
As a result, once a trade-liberalizing agreement is reached and imple-
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mented, the balance of political power may shift importantly and immediately
against those who were previously the beneficiaries of protection. When this
fact is coupled with the fact that their sunk investments will begin to decay
and their returns to renewed protection will accordingly diminish with time,
it seems plausible to us that the constituency for renewed protection will
often lack the political muscle to secure it, even if renewed protection would
not result in any international sanction of consequence.
We do not suggest, however, that a renewal of protection would always
be unilaterally unattractive. After all, the fact that protection had once been
afforded indicates that the political forces benefiting from it were powerful
enough to secure it. It is certainly unrealistic to suppose that every time a
trade agreement is struck, the forces supporting renewed protection lose so
much relative influence that they could not effectively prevail on their governments to restore it if there were no international penalty to be paid. We
thus turn to other factors that help encourage adherence to trade commitments.
2.

Reputation

Nations that renege on their commitments may be expected to face some
reputational cost in the form of having to deal with other nations on less
favorable terms in the future. This cost will be borne not only in future
dealings with the nation aggrieved by a breach of promise, but also in dealings
with all other nations that are aware of the breach.
The skeptic might question whether such reputational penalties will be of
much importance in the trading system, however, because their costs might
seem to be widely diffused. If the United States reneges on a WTO obligation,
for example, such behavior might be expected to diminish the opportunity
for the United States to strike favorable trade deals in future negotiating
sessions. Yet the domestic beneficiaries of those deals might be hard to
predict, and the benefits lost by any single organized group might be small
in present value. Accordingly, therefore, one might conjecture that no domestic interest group would worry much about the consequences of reneging
for the nation's reputation and hence that a fear of reputational damage to
the nation will not much constrain domestic political officials who otherwise
find it in their interest to renege on promises.
This skeptical view is wrong for three reasons. First, in the WTO/GATT
system, negotiations are ongoing more or less in perpetuity. Of late, for
example, negotiations over commitments in various service sectors remain
very much on the table, as do a number of other topics. In many instances,
therefore, the loss of an ability to make credible promises will immediately
come back to haunt negotiators representing specific and well-organized
groups with a current stake in negotiating progress.
Second, it would be a mistake to suppose that reputation is cabined to the
trade area. Nations are engaged in a never-ending series of diplomatic ini-
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tiatives on matters ranging from trade to national security to human rights
and so on. Typically, the entity that represents a nation in trade negotiations
(in the United States, the executive branch) must also negotiate on these
other matters. It is quite likely, therefore, that a linkage exists between credibility in the trade-negotiating field and credibility in other matters of current
concern.
Third, even if reputational costs in the form of forgone opportunities for
future trade liberalization would be borne by a fairly diffuse group of exporters, it does not follow that they will be ineffective at organizing today
to protect themselves. Exporting interests can form associations with the
mission of overcoming such collective-action difficulties. Entities like the
American Chamber of Commerce, for example, can and do serve that function. Likewise, exporters can install political agents who have their interests
at heart (either because of the agents' ideology or because of their employment prospects on leaving government). These agents will then act to protect
their reputations as effective negotiators for export interests (the U.S. trade
representative is illustrative) by actively opposing any proposals to renege
on past bargains.
One difficulty with reputational penalties, of course, is that they depend
on the quality of information in the trading community about the behavior
of violators. Such information may be particularly imperfect as to violations
by trading partners that affect third countries; that is, if the United States
reneges on an obligation to Brazil, will the EU find out about it and take it
into account with respect to future dealings with the United States?
This concern highlights the value of a central dispute authority to hear the
merits of complaints, even if that authority has no power to authorize sanctions. By serving as a vehicle for transmitting information about violations
throughout the trading system, central dispute resolution enhances the reputational costs of cheating. We think that under the consensus-based system
of the old GAT, this was the primary function of the dispute system. Further,
the fact that a disputant could block the formation of a panel to hear the
merits until 1989 did not destroy the efficacy of the system, for in most
cases, the refusal of a disputant to allow the formation of a dispute panel
would suffice for an adverse inference by other nations.
If this last claim is correct, however, why did the system evolve in 1989
into one in which disputants could no longer block the formation of dispute
panels to hear the merits? Two answers may be given.
Cases may have existed in which blocking did not suffice for an adverse
inference. Nations might have claimed, for example, that their decision to
block a panel rested on the costliness of the panel process or on some fear
that the panel process could not be expected to resolve the case correctly. It
may have been difficult for other nations to tell when such assertions were
disingenuous, and if this is so, the decision by the members to afford panels
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automatically may have indeed been taken to enhance the reputational penalties for violators.
Alternatively, dispute rulings may provide public goods to an extent. Contract theory teaches that parties leave gaps in contracts or use ambiguous
language because it is too costly to anticipate what behavior will be in their
joint interests or to express precisely what behavior is optimal under every
imaginable contingency. When contractual incompleteness leads to disputes,
a third-party enforcer can generate joint gains for the parties by resolving
the dispute in the way that maximizes joint welfare, that is, in the way that
corresponds to what the parties would have chosen for themselves in the
absence of transaction costs.47 Of course, gap filling by a third-party enforcer

is not helpful if the resultant gap fillers are chosen improperly. But the
agreements that constituted the GATT system were exceedingly elaborate
and ultimately grew to hundreds of pages in length, replete with various
principles on which panels could draw to guide their analysis (the new WTO
agreements are even more elaborate, so the point carries forward). It is thus
plausible that panel-generated gap fillers under the WTO/GATT system serve
the joint interests of the members in a fairly high percentage of cases.
A party to a dispute might nevertheless have blocked the formation of a
panel if it expected that it would probably lose. Even if an adverse inference
would then have been drawn by others about the behavior of that party, there
may still have been some virtue in ensuring that the panel process could go
forward anyway to help clarify the terms of the bargain for everybody. This
may have become increasingly true with time, as the GATT system came to
encompass more and more side agreements covering many topics. The decision in 1989 to allow complaining parties to obtain a panel decision as a
matter of right, therefore, may have reflected increasing benefits in the use
of the panel process to generate gap fillers for the membership owing to the
increasing complexity of the system.
In summary, we believe that reputation played and continues to play an
important role in enforcing the rules of the trading system. But we do not
wish to overstate the case. Most of the time, reputation undoubtedly functions
as an imperfect check on opportunism here as elsewhere. Thus, the system
also has room for sanctions beyond simply reputational costs.
3.

Unilateral Sanctions

When a nation breaches a trade commitment and the harm done is material
and noticeable to the foreign exporters that benefit from the promise, those
interest groups may be expected to complain to their political representatives
and to reward those officials for taking action to correct the problem. Re" See generally Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1992).
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gardless of the nature of third-party dispute resolution at the international
level, therefore, nations will have an incentive to punish breach of promise
by other nations. Furthermore, to the extent that sanctions will take the form
of protectionist measures that benefit domestic industries in the sanctioning
country, they may actually generate political rewards from those industries
for the officials that impose them, further adding to the incentive to employ
them.
The prospect of unilateral sanctions is not merely hypothetical. In the
United States, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 has long authorized the
executive branch to retaliate for breach of trade agreements by other nations.48
The EU has a similar statute on the books, and both statutes have been used.49
In other nations, statutory enactments that authorize retaliation may be absent,
but the inherent powers of political authorities to take action often make
formal authority unnecessary.
The growth of unilateral retaliation was a natural response to the consensus
rule that prevented centralized sanctions. Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere
that Section 301 and its various formal and informal international counterparts
(the European Community enacted a mirror statute) were valuable tools for
holding the trading system together by affording useful self-help strategies
in the face of the limitations in the GATT dispute settlement system."0
The skeptic might again respond, however, that the prospect of unilateral
retaliation may be a relatively weak deterrent to violations. The effects of
retaliation, the argument might run, will be felt by an unpredictable and
diffuse set of export interests who each face relatively small expected costs
of retaliation at the time a violation is contemplated. Collective-action problems will impede them from organizing to oppose the violation.
Our answer here is much as before. Exporters will form associations to
internalize these diffuse costs and try as best they can to install agents in
the political process who will take proper account of them. Furthermore,
nations fearful that another nation may violate its commitments will find it
in their strategic interest to preannounce targets of retaliation in order to
mobilize them. The common practice in Washington, D.C., of drawing up
"retaliation lists" in Section 301 cases prior to the imposition of any actual
sanctions serves precisely this purpose."
" See Trade Act of 1974, §§ 301-06 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16), as amended, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, tit. IX, 93 Stat. 295 (1979), Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 304, 306, 98 Stat. 3002
(1984); Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1301-02.
49 See, for example, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 264/84 on the Strengthening of the
Common Commercial Policy with Regard in Particular to Protection against Illicit Commercial
Practices, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1.
" See Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations:
The Limit Case for Section 301, 23 Law & Pol. Int'l Bus. 263, 266 (1992).
"' See, for example, GATT: U.S., EC Announce Breakthrough in GATT Trade Talks, Oilseeds
Dispute, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1990 (November 25, 1992) (chronicling U.S. trade repre-
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4.

Summary

For the reasons given here, the level of compliance with trade commitments
is quite high even if there is no credible threat of sanctions for misbehavior.
The GATT system thus worked quite well without sanctions, and were it not
for the recent innovations in the DSU we could end here. But the drafters
of the WTO agreements decided to replace the old GATT dispute resolution
system with a meaningful prospect of formal sanctions for violations that
are not corrected after a reasonable period of time. We now offer an explanation for those changes in the system.
B.

The New Prospect of Sanctionsfor Violations That
Are Not Cured within a Reasonable Time

The DSU changes the rules and embraces a "reverse consensus" principle,
under which sanctions will be authorized after the dispute process has determined that a violation exists and a reasonable time for cure has elapsed,
unless a consensus exists against sanctions (which would have to include
the party (or parties) that filed the complaint and prevailed).52 Consequently,
sanctions are a real threat to the recalcitrant violator and have already been
employed a number of times. What has not been assigned sufficient importance, however, is that although the DSU made sanctions a real possibility,
it did not change another feature of the system that greatly restricts the value
of sanctions in inducing nations to comply with their obligations. As we
have noted, a sanction cannot be imposed until a dispute panel finds that a
violation has occurred, the appellate body affirms the panel's finding if an
appeal is filed, and the violation continues although a reasonable period of
time to cure it has elapsed. Thus, the sanction operates only prospectively.
As a result, a country can commit a violation and continue it for a considerable
time without incurring any formal penalty.
What is the logic of this new system? Does its adoption put the lie to our
claim that formal sanctions are not necessary to achieve a high level of
compliance? And if formal sanctions are indeed important to deter violations,
why limit them to violators who have been caught and continue to cause
harm after they have been given a chance to reform their behavior? Does
that not invite cheating in hopes of avoiding detection, followed by delay
when caught to exploit the reasonable time for cure?
To answer these questions, we begin by reiterating the claim that flagrant
cheating has been uncommon in the system through the years. Domestic
political constraints, concerns for reputation, and unilateral sanctions indeed
sentative's compilation of a "retaliation list" for use under Section 301 against the European

Community).

52See DSU, supra note 2, art. 22(7).
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produced a high level of compliance under the GAIT, and there is little
reason to think that they would not work similarly in the WTO. As a result,
many (although not all) of the disputes that arise involve good-faith clashes
over ambiguous terms of the bargain. In these circumstances, countries are
often genuinely uncertain about what they are obliged to do, and sanctions
may have the effect of punishing them for good-faith behavior. Not only is
there little deterrence value to such punishment, but it may prove somewhat
destabilizing to the trading system and provide further political ammunition
to those who would scuttle it on the basis of sovereignty claims and the like.
Indeed, as suggested earlier, there may be instances in which WTO provisions have been intentionally left vague because an expert body, deciding
ex post what conduct is value maximizing, may be a better instrument for
facilitating mutually advantageous conduct than the ex ante predictions of
members as to what will be in their mutual advantage in the many circumstances that may arise. A country found to be in violation of such obligations
after the fact may thus have supplied a public good by becoming the test
case on a particular issue. The absence of sanctions for behavior prior to an
adverse ruling may thus be seen as a way to encourage nations to litigate
their disputes to conclusion so as to clarify the rules for everyone.
Once an adverse ruling comes down, however, matters change. If rulings
are indeed constructive gap fillers, compliance with them will ordinarily
generate joint gains, and renegotiation of most-favored-nation tariff commitments will often (although not always, as discussed earlier) be a better
way to protect import-competing industries than ongoing violations of nontariff provisions.
Does this line of reasoning explain why sanctions are now available, following the lapse of a reasonable time for cure? We must answer no, lest we
introduce inconsistency into our argument. Once a ruling adverse to a WTO
member is issued, a refusal to comply would otherwise be subject to the
same reputational penalties and unilateral sanctions that we discussed earlier.
Why are they not enough, and what motivated the drafters of the DSU to
introduce the prospect of meaningful sanctions at this stage of the process?
Our answer is to suggest that the innovation of the DSU was intended not
so much to deter violations of most substantive rules, for such violations, if
clear, were already fairly well deterred, as we have argued. What the new
system really adds is the opportunity for the losing disputant to "buy out"
of the violation at a price set by an arbitrator who has examined carefully
the question of what sanctions are substantially equivalent to the harm done
by the violation.
By contrast, the situation immediately prior to the entry into force of the
WTO was one in which unilateral retaliation was becoming more and more
common. Cases under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, in particular,
were becoming more frequent. And the 1988 amendments to that statute
created a timetable for retaliatory action by the United States that could

HeinOnline -- 31 J. Legal Stud. S201 2002

S202

THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

require it to sanction an alleged violator even before the GATT panel process
had run its course." The distinct possibility thus arose that the United States
would impose a sanction based on a unilateral determination that another
party was in breach of the GAIT, even if a dispute panel would find that
the U.S. complaint lacked merit. Further, although the statute directed the
U.S. trade representative to impose a sanction commensurate with the burden
on U.S. commerce caused by the violation,54 the United States was the sole
arbiter of whether its sanction in fact met that test. The international community might thus have reason to be concerned that the United States might
impose sanctions for the purpose of foisting an opportunistic construction of
the bargain on trading partners or that the unilateral sanctions might be
excessive and discourage efficient breach. The political pressures for other
trading nations to arm themselves with similar potentially disruptive unilateral
strategies were no doubt considerable. Thus, a fear was developing that
unilateral sanctions in the name of enforcing the bargain were being co-opted
in a way that would allow trading nations to renege on the bargain.
The skeptic will immediately wonder, however, why this type of reneging
was not adequately constrained by the factors that we claimed were reasonably effective under the consensus-based system-reputation and unilateral
sanctions. In one important respect, we believe it was. In particular, a threat
of unilateral sanctions could in principle be employed to induce a country
to accept an excessively demanding interpretation of its obligations. But, as
one of us has argued, this did not occur. The United States agreed to submit
its claims of violations to determination by the GAT, and, unless dispute
resolution dragged on too long without result, the United States also committed itself to await the GAIT determination and be bound by it. In fact,
the United States never acted contrary to a GAIT ruling-it never "took the
law into its own hands" in finding a violation by another party. Accordingly,
one of us previously concluded that U.S. actions under Section 301 did not
advance excessively demanding interpretations of the obligations owed to it
under the GATT55 Such analysis suggests that with respect to the existence
of a violation by another nation, the United States was substantially, if not
perfectly, constrained by reputational concerns, reinforced by the possibility
of authoritative GATT rulings against it and a fear of unilateral retaliation
for misbehavior.
There is another dimension to unilateral sanctions and threats, however,
that may have been subject to greater strategic manipulation. When a violation
occurs, a system of unilateral retaliation leaves it to the aggrieved nation to
" See 19 U.S.C. §§2411(a)(1), 2411(d)(4)(A) (1988).
5' See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411 (c) (requiring that sanctions must "be devised so as to affect goods
or services of the foreign country in an amount that is equivalent in value to the burden being
imposed by that country in U.S. commerce").
" See Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some
Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. Int'l L. J. 301, 311 (1990).
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set the magnitude of the sanction. Although the GATT system had always
required that any sanction be substantially equivalent to the harm done by
the violation, the question of whether an actual or threatened sanction was
excessive by this standard might be one about which the members of the
trading community have very poor information. Indeed, the harm caused by
a violation to another country or to its political officials is almost certainly
difficult for other nations to ascertain. If so, a nation injured by a violation
might be able to threaten or to impose an excessive sanction without incurring
reputational penalties. Consequently, excessive actual or threatened unilateral
sanctions may have become an important actual or potential impediment to
efficient breaches within the system. 6
Under the new DSU, by contrast and as noted previously, a binding arbitration system is established to consider the magnitude of the sanctions.
No sanctions can be imposed until the arbitration process has run its course
if the violator nation insists on it. The new system thus does a better job of
protecting violators from the actual or threatened imposition of excessive
sanctions. In turn, it ought to perform better than the old system at ensuring
that opportunities for efficient breach are not undermined.
The same conclusion can be reached in another way, which we think
bolsters it considerably. In particular, consider the question of what really
changes under the new DSU. Penalties for breach existed under the old
system, both in the form of reputational costs and unilateral sanctions. The
penalties for breach under the new DSU will, as a practical matter, be much
the same-reputational costs will attach to roughly the same degree as before
(especially after the 1989 understanding that eliminated the ability of disputants to block the formation of a panel), and any sanctions approved by
the DSB will continue to take the form of measures by the aggrieved country
(or countries) to punish the violator through a withdrawal of trade concessions. The primary difference is that those measures can now be reviewed
by a binding arbitral panel for excessiveness before they can be put into
place, whereas before they were unilaterally announced and implemented
without review by the GAIT.
Thus, the innovation of the new DSU is very much consistent with, and
we believe motivated by, the perception that unilateral sanctions were in need
of greater centralized oversight. If we are right, then the reason for authorizing
sanctions against recalcitrant violators in the new DSU is not to punish them
so much as to protect them-instead of having to buy their way out in a
world of unilateral threats and counterthreats unconstrained by central oversight, the new system ensures that the price for noncompliance will be set
in accordance with an honest and unbiased effort to assess the harm to the
affected party (or parties).
3 See, for example, C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 209 (1997).
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V.

CONCLUSION

Treaties are contracts of a sort, and the lessons developed by law and
economics scholars regarding the way that private contracting parties structure their bargains accordingly have much to teach us about the structure of
treaties. In this paper, we have argued that the WTO system prefers a liability
rule to a property rule-roughly, expectation damages to a rule of specific
performance-primarily because of the transaction costs and holdup problems
that would arise under a property rule in a system with 144 players. We have
further advanced a theory as to how formal sanctions are not needed to
induce a high level of compliance with most WTO obligations, owing to the
domestic pressures for compliance that often exist and to the reputational
penalties and unilateral sanctions that further pressure parties to respect their
commitments even absent formal sanctions. The value of dispute resolution
cases, therefore, may lie more in clarifying the rules and filling in missing
terms of the bargain than in detecting and punishing cheaters. It is for this
reason that the losing party in a dispute proceeding pays no penalty if it
obeys the recommendations of the dispute process. Last, we argue that the
recent advent of formal sanctions for parties that lose a dispute proceeding
and refuse to conform their policies within a reasonable time is a response
not so much to the undercompliance with substantive obligations that arises
absent these sanctions, but to the danger of excessive unilateral sanctions
that exists in the absence of centralized oversight regarding the magnitude
of sanctions. This problem arises because the harm done by a violation is
not easily observable absent a careful examination by an arbitrator, and thus
a party that imposes an excessive unilateral sanction will be hard to detect
and so will not suffer the usual penalties associated with misbehavior. The
new arbitral process substitutes an unbiased determination as to the proper
magnitude of the sanction for a unilateral judgment about it by the aggrieved
party and thus better ensures that the price for deviating from WTO obligations is not set inefficiently high.
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